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I 
Research for Environment The 
I was attracted to Alaska from Brazil by what appeared to be 
a request by a powerful figure in the legal system, the Chief 
Justice of the Alaska State Supreme Court. He sought to adjust 
the state justice process to the needs of village Alaska1 through 
a process of team research by a lawyer and an anthropologist 
which he hoped would lead to an agenda for reform. 
In personal conversations, Chief Justice George Boney was 
receptive to approaches I had discovered to be useful in other 
environments. For example, he and other justice officials urged 
research on customary law ways leading to evaluation and solution 
of problems associated with Native contact with a modern central­
ized state legal system. He was receptive as well to training 
and deployment of Native paralegals aS" legal culture brokers 
between systems, a device with which I had found effective in law 
practice on the Navajo reservation and in development of 
bicultural legal education for Navajo students. 
In preliminary research in Alaska villages, prior to my 
move to Alaska, I began to discover that local dispute adjustment 
in institutionalized and non-institutionalized form lay at the 
heart of daily village justice. I was also encouraged by recom­
mendations by participants in Alaska's first Bush Justice 
Conference that "the locus of decision making in the administra­
tion of justice in village Alaska must move closer to the 
village," and calls for "greater Native participation at all 
levels of the administration of justice" (Alaska Judicial 
Council, Bush Justice Conference, 1970:2). 
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This first conference was attended by white policymakers only 
with two exceptions (an Eskimo magistrate from Barrow and an 
Eskimo district court judge from Bethel). Yet its recommen-
dations called for significant changes in the Alaska legal pro­
cess at the lop c1nd at the bottom. 
For example, the call for Natives "in policy-making positions 
in all agencies involved" included specific requests for an 
Alaska Native on the Judicial Council (Id: 2). The Council 
chaired by the chief justice screens judicial candidates and has 
a potentially great influence on the judicial system. 
The conference stated that "strengthening of village councils 
is central to the administration of justice in remote Alaska" 
(Id:2). It called for the legitimization, encouragement and 
development of dispositional process alternatives for adults and 
juveniles (Id: 5). At the same time, it advocated provisions for 
"detention facilities" (Id: 3) in villages for adults and juve­
niles, and it stressed the need for the funding of a program 
creating village constables in village Alaska to be chosen by 
village law enforcement officers with the support of the Alaska 
State Troopers (Id:2). 
Professional justice was also to be improved. Trials were to 
be held in more rural locations, police and judicial travel 
budgets were to be increased, and education and recruitment of 
Natives in each justice bureaucracy was to be accomplished. 
Cultural differences and the implications of each were 
addressed in ways not unfamiliar to those of you who have worked 
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( 
in Australia, Canada and other places. " ( T )he cultural context 
and impact of judicial administration must be thoroughly 
understood by all involved in the system of bush justice" (Id:4). 
Court arrnignments were to be conducted in Native languages 
and bilingual attorneys or para-professionals were to be 
recruited (Id: 6) . That an act was committed pursuant to Native 
custom was to be considered as a mitigating factor in sentencing 
(Id:6). 
The University of Alaska was requested to establish an insti­
tute to train legal personnel in both rural and urban areas in 
Native culture and languages (Id:3). The University, state 
administration and judicial council were to initiate programs of 
research concerning such areas as the character and processes of 
village law-making, judicial administration and law enforcement" 
(Id:5). 
This last recommendation is particularly important because it 
led to my invitation to join the University of Alaska. 
This agenda for reforms of bush justice reflected in turn 
several underlying currents. 
First, there was the strong organizational current based on 
the state's constitution. The constitution was drafted in reac-
tion to the territorial experience whereby authority was lodged 
in boards, in local governments, and in federal courts and admi-
nistrators, but very rarely in the territorial government 
(Fischer, 1975). 
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The constitution established a centralized court system (with 
no pockets of local autonomy such as county courts); a Department 
of Public Safety; a Division of Corrections within the Depart­
ment of Heal th and Social Services; a Department of Law; and a 
state Public Defender Agency. Each of the latter agencies were 
headed by appointees of the governor. These state agencies had 
some limited competition from incorporated cities and organized 
boroughs. But in bush Alaska, it is fair to say that they had 
free reign over any local level of service. 
Second, a funding current pitted the bush proponents against 
the commanding hand of the urban funders. The 1970's were days 
in which agency heads sat on the Governor's Commission for the 
Administration of Justice and divided the all-too-limited LEAA 
pie. Local police departments came hat in hand to commission 
meetings. Powerful white communities such as Anchorage, 
Fairbanks and Juneau were awarded seats on the Commission and 
some share of the pie. 
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months two drowned He speculate. only can One justice? rural 
1972. in arrived I after 
Boney was said to have his eyes on the governorship. Unlike 
the chief justices that followed, he relished the political pro-
cess. As chairman of the Governor's Commission he could meld 
usually competing agencies together around a theme that had no 
overt opposition. In fact, the Department of Public Safety was 
safely in favor of bush justice reforms. It desired to retain 
the unorganized borough as its prime constituency as urban police 
contested their position in major cities. 
The Division of Corrections was seemingly susceptible to 
coercion by Boney. As a subordinate and not co-equal agency, it 
was in the unhappy position of having unpopular urban jails 
filled with rural inmates cut loose from their rural communities. 
Did Boney seek to assert state authority over what was soon 
to become Native land under the banner of bush justice reform? 
Did he seek to follow the lead of U.S. Senator Mike Gravel who 
successfully used bush voters as a new lever to sweep past incum­
bent Senator Ernest Gruening and a democratic plurality? 
With Boney's death at 39 went the secret of his private moti-
vations. At that time the mantle of chief justice passed to Jay 
Rabinowitz, a jurist devoted to the concept of equal justice, but 
entirely disinclined to coordinate and direct competing factions 
within the justice system. The impetus for direction of the 
justice system and content passed back to the discrete depart­
ments charged with policing, prosecution, defense and correc-
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tions. Continuance of meetings of the Governor's Commission was 
for little more than division of the federal spoils. 
In the court system, initiative passed to a professional 
court administrator who drew the court into concerns normal to 
large urban bureaucracies and their constituencies. 
If one looks back over the decade to the original agenda for 
reform and reads the accompanying scorecard against accomplish­
ments, the picture which emerges is bitter and bleak indeed, for 
Natives who participated in two later Bush Justice Conferences. 
This is particularly true for the Alaska Federation of Natives 
who had, for a time, a bush justice team. Or even for 
researchers, as each operated on the principle that bureaucracies 
could be motivated by accomplishments in the field to reform the 
greater institutions, or at least to adapt roles to rural needs 
and expectations or supply resources where they were lacking. 
Only where Native organizations marshalled their own politi­
cal resources to seek legislative change or governmental control 
have there come some significant changes. But even these changes 
have led to the increase of levels of Western legal presence in 
ways often at odds with village constituencies. 
Villages remain Western legal colonies, subject to either 
inadequate legal assistance or, in other cases, gross over­
policing that draws half of a town's population into the jail 
system under the guise of protective custody for alcohol related 
behavior (Boedeker, 1981; Conn 1981a). 
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For the researcher, then, an evaluation of his role in this 
process must include very serious professional soul searching. 
Did his emphasis upon cultural adaptation understate ano conceal 
the political imperatives which dictated the allocation of 
resources throughout the period? Did "cultural difference" pro-
vide the scapegoat for justice decision makers to avoid hard 
decisions within their own realm? Did some spurious allegiance 
to village autonomy and its local law provide a continuing justi­
fication for inadequate state intervention to deal with violent 
crime? Was this not an inadequacy which actually amounts to 
ground level disdain for village survival? 
Three Camps 
One can divide those with deepest concern for matters of bush 
justice into three camps. This division is important since 
perspectives borne out of self-interest and experience are criti­
cal to understanding motivation and interpretations of events. 
The first camp is that of the legal professionals. They may 
be divided into policy makers at the top and field operatives at 
the bottom. At the top of the supreme court is the chief 
justice, a man deeply concerned with the ideology of due process. 
He is particularly concerned with the image of his court. His 
lieutenant, the administrator of the state court system, is con­
cerned with the health and welfare of his own growing bureaucracy 
and its competence as measured by the legislature, by practicing 
attorneys and by high court judges. Their counterpart in the 
Department of Health and Social Services is the head of Division 
of Corrections. Their counterparts in the Department of Law are 
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Fielcl operatives represent the agency in town locations which 
.serve as service centers. A single corrections officer in the 
town of Bethel, for example, provides juvenile intake and dispo­
sition, probation, parole and, presentence reports for convicted 
felons for a region about the size of the state of Oregon, with 
57 villages and 29,000 persons. The town's public defender and 
assistant district attorney each have the same position within 
their own bureaucracy and the same village clientele. 
The field operatives have direct contact with villages and 
their justice systems, both official and extraofficial. Their 
mandate is to keep their agency's service record clean, "to keep 
the lid on." Although they have usually very clear perspectives 
of bush justice, their propensity to blow the whistle on inade­
quate service and lack of sufficient funds from their agency or 
from others must be weighed with career considerations. They are 
not in a position to change the allocation of resources of their 
own agencies or others without jeopardizing their own careers. 
Discrete agencies are also not prepared to collaborate at the top 
though necessity may compel collaboration in the field. Thus in 
1975 in Nome, it could be said that the justice system played 
basketball on Thursday nights. Each system agency views his 
service and village connections as separate from the other. Only 
the village views all contact from justice agencies as coming
-8-
from a single source. 
The second camp is comprised of consumers. Twice in 1974 and 
in 1976 they have been given a chance to express their concerns 
to justice professionals thr9ugh Bush Justice Conferences. More 
often, usually around election time, they have aired their 
complaints to visiting agency heads in what have been termed dog 
and pony shows (See Easely, 1973). They have spoken to commit­
tees established by Alaska Federation of Natives and, of course, 
to researchers and field representatives of justice agencies. 
Legislatively appointed auditors and special committees have 
periodically traveled to the village for "input." 
Those members of this village constituency nominated as 
magistrates, village police, or correctional aides may be termed 
paraprofessionals. They are set apart from field professionals 
if not by their actual work, then because they do not enjoy 
limited professional lines of communication which stretch from 
town to urban bureaucracies. Village magistrates and police 
exist in a nether world, making loose connections between the 
power stuctures of state justice and village justice. 
The researchers are the third camp. They were called upon to 
study the relationships between the state and village justice 
processes. They also zeroed in on the relationships of Natives 
to one or both systems each from legal perspectives, historical 
perspectives, anthropological perspectives, but rarely from 
political perspectives. Over ten years they researched, tested 
and recommended solutions to policymaking professionals. These 
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professionals purportedly sought to deliver Western law services 
to villaqes in an environment challenging to the structures, pro­
cesses and roles placed within it unless they were adapted to it. 
In the main these recommendations were little more than adap­
tations of urban structures, process and roles to allow for con­
tinuing control at the village level by village people along with 
guarantees of direct participation by them in state legal process 
as they needed it. 
In short, the work of researchers tended to concentrate 
around the delivery of services to villages and the interplay of 
village and state legal process. In this it was not unlike that 
of the bush field operatives except that it was less town and 
more village centered as well as being less oriented to a single 
justice bureaucracy. 
As with the paraprofessionals, researchers reported to both 
systems but had a power base _in neither.2 Outside of the justice 
bureacracies they operated somewhat out of control of all key 
participants but had access to any and all. Researchers were in 
a position to monitor the flow of justice matters through the 
prisms of each group over time and across cultural boundaries 
Researchers had time to think. There was apparently no deadline. 
What is the bush justice system in Alaska? 
It is a constitutional scheme of rule making, law enforce­
ment, adjudication, defense and correctional activity which feeds 
through separate and highly centralized bureaucratic channels 
from urban Alaska to small towns from which fledgling governmen-
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tal services flow to networks of rural villages. These 150 vil-
lages of 300 persons on the average are predominantly Eskimo or 
Indian. Town legal connections with the villages are formed in 
some instances by paraprofessional judges, police or ex-official 
bodies such as village councils who report some serious cases to 
state field operatives in town. More often connections are 
triggeren hy reports of serious crime ann removal of offenders 
and victims to towns by the appropriate agencies. 
In Eskimo village society all law jobs and institutions have 
been designed by whites. Eskimos, only, implemented and devel-
oped them. Thus the "state legal system" and the "village legal 
system" are both white creations from their inception. Despite 
this unhappy fact, the village systems work to the extent that 
Eskimos are innovative within the constraints of these roles and 
institutions. But no Eskimo person in Alaska would suggest that 
village justice systems were constructed to handle all matters 
serious and unserious. 
Years Early The 
In Alaska village councils, locally elected bodies have now 
had 60 years of experience in the business of dispute adjustment. 
( See Conn and Hippler, 1973). Teacher-missionaries introduced 
these institutions. Their intent appears to have been to use the 
councils to advance their own agenda of reform: to suppress the 
manufacture of hootch, to seek out and punish sinners and to urge 
upon parents the discipline necessary to operate village schools 
in communities still geared to the rhythms of hunting and 
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fishing. 
Councils over time cut loose from teachers and found a place 
within the larger web of white and Eskimo social control. 
Village councils were more easily grafted into the then-present 
configuration of formal law and the Eskimo law ways than was the 
case with Athabascan villages where systems of chiefs and clans, 
figures of pre-contact Athabascan law ways were challenged (Conn 
and Hippler, 1972). Thus Eskimo experience is reflected in the 
following decription of councils. 
Roles Council Village 
In the Eskimo communities, representatives of leading fami-
lies formed a consensus within councils. Village councils fit 
within the process of community and state law. Councils back­
stopped and extended dispute adjustment. This reflected the 
classic approaches of conflict avoidance - conciliation, gossip, 
ostracism and counseling among Eskimos. But, as important, they 
were supported from the outset by white village residents 
(teacher-missionaries deputized under federal law), the board of 
elders in Presbyterian and Moravian communities, occasional resi­
dent U.S. Commissioners and nonresident marshalls, Coast Guard 
cutters and even a distant court system (Milan, 1964). 
Councils were the last stop in a process of evolving inter­
personal customary law ways and the first step in a process of 
Western intervention that could result in referral to a police 
and court process outside of the village. Councils settled into 
a routine of dealing selectively with persons whose social ties 
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to the village made them somewhat less responsive to approaches 
that were geared chiefly to drawing an offender back into a 
social consensus (Conn, 197 5). �hese ties were based both upon 
the need to retain and to sustain economic relationships upon 
which survival depended. Confessing or compromising before a 
council also avoided removal by the Western law process. 
Western legal intervention had made impossible (or at least 
more dangerous) killing or banishment as final steps in a custom-
ary legal process. However, to a certain extent it had replaced 
these ultimate steps when deviants persistently refused to 
respond to social cues conveyed outside of the council or within 
the village's interpersonal process, with removal into its own 
legal process in a distant place. 
Councils were most often an Eskimo institution of last resort 
but even within its processes of case adjustment were opportuni­
ties to admit one's guilt, ask forgiveness and be reintegrated 
into the community. Orientation and not punishment was the usual 
result of the process. Two or three appearances before a council 
could be anticipated before it sought to draw in outside police 
authority. 
Councils were draped in official and ex-official legal 
authority. In territorial days (pre-1959) this allowed them to 
operate as police courts where a U.S. Commissioner was not pres­
ent. The status of many under federal Indian law gave them power 
( according to visiting Bureau of Indian Affairs officials) to 
govern members of the Indian community (Case, 1978). In addition 
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federal law until 1948 and territorial law until 1953 prohibited 
the purchase of liquor by or sale to Alaska Natives. White 
government agents, resident and non-resident, singled out 
homebrew manufacture. Suppression of alcohol use among villagers 
became their special legal tasks (Conn, 1981b). 
Intervention by marshall, Indian police, liquor suppression 
agents and later territorial police, while limited by geography 
and state resources, was sufficient in territorial days to rein­
force the council when it responded punitively. More important, 
however, it shifted its focus to deal with matters before a 
situation exploded into violent or actual conflict. Not only the 
official blanket of prohibition but also limited wage opportuni­
ties and difficulties of transportation and communication gave 
village councils their special opportunity. By reacting to 
incipient conflict or to the seeds of later conflict, councils 
avoided confrontation with either villagers or with agents of the 
official legal system (See Conn and Hippler, 1975). 
Years Later The 
A variety of factors destabilized the council as a mechanism 
for dispute adjustment in the years immediately following state­
hood ( 1959). In meetings with state officials, council presi­
dents learned that state officials would not support bans on 
liquor possession or manufacture (Conn, 1981a). "Village rules" 
were distributed by district attorneys, rules easily transferable 
into state violations. Two factors made this arrangement 
unworkable. First, promised supportive intervention by the 
troopers when councils requested it was not forthcoming. In the 
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Bethel region alone, for example, in 1963 a single trooper pro­
vided service to 57 villages. 
Villages were informed that they were to handle matters on 
their own and notify the police only when violent felonies had 
occurred. Letters to police during the period demonstrate that 
detailed descriptions of repeated violence were often left 
unanswered. Second, in the early 1970' s drunken behavior in 
public or in private was decriminalized. Although police 
pickups, under a protective custody provision were allowed, only 
towns and cities capable of underwriting a substantial police and 
jail operation could use this device as a net to deal preven­
tively with drunken behavior. 
In the late 1960' s, the court system introduced appointed 
Native justices of the peace (called magistrates) into about 
30 Native villages. Where this occurred, villages councils 
deferred to this official authority and refused further com-
plaints (Conn and Hippler, 1973b). Yet because matters heard by 
councils were often pre-or sublegal in Western terms because 
complainants did not wish to confront fellow villagers, and 
because village policing was unstable, transfer of authority did 
not induce a transfer of the activity which councils were best 
equipped to carry out. Most villages did not receive magis-
trates, and could not appoint them without court approval. 
Social factors also de-established the balance critical to 
the relationship. Service centers such as Bethel became ready 
sources of wage opportunities and bootleg liquor. Youthful popu-
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lations rose dramatically partially as a result of improved 
health care and populations shifted from villages more distant 
from towns to those within relatively close proximity to towns. 
What did not increase rapidly during the 1960' s or early 
1970' s ( the latter period in which our applied research began) 
was professional service. Only one superior court judge, 
district attorney and public defender resided in rural Alaska, a 
relic of a court established in Nome during the gold rush days 
for a then 20,000 person ( now 2,000) white population. Bethel 
contained an Eskimo district court judge. Other professionals 
(with the exception of a legal services attorney who married into 
the community and became the first superior court judge in 1975) 
migrated from Anchorage, Fairbanks and Nome. 3 In Barrow a 
magistrate and trooper were the only professionals in residence 
for the nine villages on the North Slope. 
The Division of Corrections employed two corrections officers 
for all correctional tasks, one in Bethel and one in Nome. They 
were assisted by correctional aides, one in Bethel and one in 
Kotzebue. 
Thus one could conclude that while the social environment 
underwent changes at every turn, the state justice system changed 
in smaller ways. 
Justice Council on Impact 
Councils as ins ti tut ions have continued to play a central 
role in dispute processing in more than a 100 villages without 
-16-
magistrates. Yet to continue that activity councils were forced 
to become less "council-like," by earlier definitions, and more 
court-like by magistrate terms. 
Councils confronted a more persistent stream of conflicts of 
;=\ rnc::i<Jnitucle ,rn<'l severity unlike the immecl ia te past. 
Surprisingly, Western intervention was less reliable and less 
predictable. 
With external punitive intervention less reliable, many coun­
cils shifted from bodies of reconciliation to bodies which 
directed fines and other sanctions at offenders. This shift from 
council-like to court-like approach was never completely success-
ful. Fines were not collectible. Official support for fining 
was verbal but never explicit. Young persons challenged council 
authority (See Conn, 1976). 
This process as it evolved involved counseling at a first 
stage, then further warnings and finally, graded attempts at 
punishment. Village councils showed through their procedures 
reluctance to apply the ultimate sanctions. Their capacity to 
call in and direct outside authority was not certain. 
In the early 1970' s troopers began to train village police 
(Angell, 1978). In conjunction with the councils, council 
marshalls had existed as extensions of the council in many 
places. These new village police, hired and paid by the council, 
were trained as Western police and charged with reporting felo­
nies to the state troopers and lesser matters to councils. Some 
reported other matters to the local authority.4 Others ignored 
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the council.5 
Still reports from police indicated that by the mid-1970' s 
eighty percent of their arrests resulted in council and not court 
disposition. In a 1977 survey of 55 villages a quarter of all 
matters processed as criminal law violations resulted in council 
or problem board disposition (Angell, 1979). In other words, 
village police appended themselves to councils, as adjudicative 
bodies for minor offenses despite the fact that for the judicial 
system, councils were illegal institutions. 
The irony of the position of the village council by the early 
1970' s should not be overlooked. As an official matter, the 
state legal system viewed village council process as an anachro­
nism, a fixture of law ways of a distant past. As an unofficial 
matter, field professionals armed with mandates from their 
superiors to carry out impossible tasks of representation, prose­
cution and law enforcement over distant villages were vocal in 
their support of what they perceived to be continuing examples of 
Eskimo justice. Cultural sensitivity or other rationalizations 
aside, they needed Native community justice systems to resolve 
their own smaller problems without professional intervention. 
Yet this very encouragement of village justice demanded that 
the village system shift from a preventative process, capable of 
anticipating problems, to one that reacted very much like Western 
systems. The balance of outside intervention with inside delib-
eration was lost and village councils found their council process 
mutated out of its original form as it was forced to handle both 
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parts of the service. 
When magistrates and village police were offered to villages 
through appointment and training, the issue was not best articu­
lated as a conflict between law systems, Western and non-Western. 
Rather, the issue was whether villagers could adequately address 
their present problems with new Western resources inferior to the 
working arrangement between formal law and village law of earlier 
days. The earlier arrangement worked in part because there were 
fewer problems. But it also worked because it contained support­
i ve elements. It allowed legal levels, one consensual, another 
punitive, to interact. But more than this, by circumstance if 
not political intent, it placed in Eskimo hands the authority to 
draw in external force. Put baldly, Western pol ice did not 
intercede unless called. The authority to call police passed 
from teachers to Eskimo councils as Indian policy directives 
directed teachers to follow the community (Jenness, 1962, Oswalt, 
196-3). In historical terms for a time the village tail then 
wagged the town dog. 
Yet under this new arrangement what appeared to be more de 
facto control of village affairs was less. Councils were left 
with the burden of acting like outside courts and police without 
their authority or capacity. Shifted outside of council activity 
by default was their capacity to anticipate and conciliate dis­
putes that were in Western terms sublegal. 
If it can be said that power over resources determines the 
flow of a legal process, then it should be no surprise that power 
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over state legal matters resides in field operatives. Further, 
that if engaged, the tendency of the state system has been to 
draw into towns and cities village legal problems for resolution 
and dispatch when it did indeed act. 
Matured social conflicts which village justice systems have 
had to undertake have outstripped their capacity to deal with 
them pre-emptively. They have also overrun their capacity to 
deal with them in Western terms through policing, judging and 
jailing (See Angell, 1981). 
Village people have called for engagement of the state pro-
cess on their own terms. This can be said to mean that while 
prepared to deal with problems preventatively they perceive that 
Western law services have historically, and must continue to make 
credible, a functioning interplay of state and local systems. 
The issue of this engagement, its predictability and its end 
results, have been the essence of bush considerations by con-
sumers, professionals and researchers. Conferences or dialogues 
by each group or a coalition of groups generate very similar 
recommendations.6 Yet perspectives vary. And so does intent. 
For example, both policy makers and field professionals have 
been prepared to verbally acknowledge and encourage village 
justice systems until such time as professional justice resources 
would (or should) replace these extralegal and paralegal means of 
social control and enforcement. Resources to replace them have 
not been rapidly forthcoming ( these viewed as travel funds for 
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town-based professionals or professionals willing to live in 
small villages). Resources are purportedly allocated according 
to "need." "Need" for such services is defined in numbers of 
cases actually dealt with by town professionals and not in high 
rates of undealt with or unreported crimes or accidents resulting 
from "intentional infliction of harm by one person to another" as 
Indian health service operations in towns categorize interper­
sonal violence (See Conn, 1981a). Need is determined by actual 
cases. Without professional services, there are fewer actual 
cases recorded than could be reported. 
The allocation of legal power between white legal agents 
representative of first military, then territorial, then state 
authority and small villages has changed little, if at all, in 
more than a hundred years of contact (Conn c, 1981: Jennes, 1962; 
and Murton, 1965). Social realities in village Alaska have 
changed, always outrunning the needs and context of engagement. 
Yet, since urban population growth and urban demands on state 
resources have also increased, professionals at the top have 
tolerated village justice systems as a catchment for problems, 
large and small, mature and embryonic. 
Village consumers (and their advocates) understand their law 
process as a legal level or compartment reinforced by strands of 
professional authority from distant urban places, strands 
extended and strands removed or broken. 
Policymakers fail to understand village justice as a com- 
ponent of their own justice system. They view village process as 
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a separate reality from which they with lesser or greater capac­
ity remove cases to be dealt with in the thoroughgoing process 
that they know to be the "real II justice system, real justice 
being a process of adversary justice leading to treatment or 
corrections. 
Professional operatives in town understand the relevance of 
matters left to village justice. But, for them, these matters 
are simply problems happily left outside of the realm of their 
own professional caseload. 
11 Progressive villages" or "villages which handle their own 
problems" are admired by town-based professionals out of relief 
more than out of respect (Nix and Timbers interviews, 1973). Yet 
few would not concur that real justice as delivered would not be 
preferable if it could flood the villages. 
What professionals fail to perceive is that the interplay of 
state and village justice must be nurtured and adapted to sur-
vive. For villagers engagement of the systems is an historical 
fact. They have sought collaboration on terms reflective of the 
stronger aspects of the village justice process and those of the 
state. This implies shared control of the process from both 
ends. It implies adaptation of roles and services in some cases, 
but also often implies a level of quality of services sufficient 
to meet purported state standards only. Most importantly, it 
reflects a recognition that village justice does not and has 
never operated in isolation of state legal practice. 
State action, both affirmative and negative, and state inac-
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tion all have their end result in strengthening or weakening 
village legal process (See Conn, 1975). 
For example, when villages complained to Alaska Federation of 
Natives that offenders returned home to their villages on the 
next plane after their arrest and before victims returned from 
hospitals, they communicated a concern about state justice which 
not only reflected their perception of its activity but one that 
suggested that the offender's rapid return affected ongoing 
collaboration (See McKenzie, 1975). Defendants had been released 
on their own recognizance because each enjoyed a constitutional 
right to bail. They may have returned with restrictions placed 
on drinking and·use of firearms, but these restrictions were not 
communicated. Even when the chief justice issued a memorandum 
asking that restrictions be explained, field operatives were 
uncertain as to whom to communicate this information. Villagers 
were uncertain as to who was to react to this information on 
behalf of the state. 
Of more relevance, a survey conducted hy researchers and 
troopers in 55 villages in 1977 revealed that on the average it 
took three days for the troopers to respond to a request for 
a s s i s tan c e ( Ange 11 , 1 9 81 ) . The head of the Department of Public 
Safety, when confronted with this data, suggested that trooper 
involvement in the survey had caused village officials to 
minimize the actual length of time necessary to respond. He 
suggested that seven days was a more likely figure (Nix inter­
view, 1977). 
Inadequate trooper response even after villagers have 
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attempted ( on the field operative' s instructions) to deal with 
less serious problems, destroys the credibility of village law 
within its own realm. That credibility is, in part, state deter­
mined. 
What then are the means to create a working process? 
Researchers, as will be discussed, have attempted to induce the 
professional bureaucracies to allocate authority for incorpo­
rating innovative practices of villages which would establish 
preventative conciliatory processes rooted in more than 50 years 
of experience. On the other end, correctional practices as 
rooted in village life as in correctional ideology would also be 
addressed. These include diversion, community-based corrections, 
volunteers, and mutual reconciliation with compensation to vie-
tims (Conn, 1976). They have recorded and viewed practices 
which, if supported by the state bureaucracies, would enhance and 
sustain their service in the bush, even if resources were limited 
in that place and shift authority to villages at critical stages 
of the process. 
A working justice process has been the objective of the 
researchers and, they believe, the village. 
Yet does this global objective translate readily into com-
partmental ideological and administrative considerations of 
separate justice agencies? Can i£ be achieved if the idealized 
picture is a fully articulated western justice system, capable of 
providing checks and balances, capable of providing due process 
and law enforcement typical of urban Alaska and urban America? 
-24-
As described, the state's perspective was urban and white 
oriented in its ideal conception of a structure of law for 
Alaska. Its allocation of resources throughout urban Alaska and 
small white town Alaska reflected this goal. 7 As stated, the 
judicial system brought into being by Alaska's constitution was 
centralized as were the Department of Law, the Public Defender 
Agency and Division of Corrections. 
The only bureaucracy whose constituency and whose strength 
.could L,e said to be in bush as well as urban centers was the 
Alaska State Troopers. There was a real advantage in the 
Department of Public Safety's capacity to claim as its jurisdic­
tion the unorganized borough that contained Northern, Western and 
Southwestern Alaska. For other bureaucracies, whose claim to 
legislative resources was built upon case load and processing, 
the bush and its problems were perceived as a drain upon institu­
tional resources. 
Perspective Institutional The -Mandates Professional 
The administrator of the court system is said to have 
referred to bush Alaska as a "can of worms." His initial visit 
to rural Alaska confirmed this impression. Implantation of a 
centralized judicial system in farflung town and village Alaska 
was problematic. Costs were high. Discovery of persons to fill 
positions was difficult. 
After the state constitution went into effect, the only offi­
cial judicial activity tolerated was through court personnel. 
Towns and villages without judges or magistrates could not offi­
cially appoint a judge or employ a council as court (Alaska State 
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Constitution _Art. 4 Sec 1, 1959). 
From an administrator's perspective allocation of judicial 
resources presented several problems: 
(1) dangers of autonomy borne from distance, lack of super­
vision and lack of indoctrination into Western legal perspective; 
(2) dangers of community influence on decisions made 
appropriate to resolution in terms of higher law; and 
(3) problems of management and supervision. 
Village magistrate activity displaced judicial activity if 
cases were heard by magistrates at defendant's request. It was 
not easily controlled. 
Magistrates were appointed by presiding superior court judges 
of judicial districts who jealously guarded their authority from 
intrusions by central administration. The court's magistrate 
supervisor lacked the power to hire and fire magistrates as did 
villages affected.a 
Yet for all of these problems, bush magistrates (along with 
village police) comprised the lion's share of Native participa­
tion in the justice system. With a single exception, there are 
no Native judges or high administrators in any state justice 
bureaucracy (Alaska State Court System, 1981). 
Bush field operatives - town district attorneys, troopers, 
public defenders, corrections officers, representatives of the 
discrete and often competing legal bureaucracies - were charged 
with what are bas1cally very similar mandates but ones which vary 
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with policy makers or administrators. 
From their town or city base, each was to cover an array of 
requests for village assistance generated both by the formal 
system and the extralegal system with their limited resources. 
To respond in every case was empirically impossible. What was 
especially avoided was a social flare-up in the urban press which 
cast aspersions on a justice bureaucracy and affected, in turn, 
its capacity to generate life giving appropriations.9 
On what terms then could reforms of bush justice be made? 
Perspectives and interpretations of II improvement II vary as one 
isolates interested constituencies. Along with institutional 
perspectives are ideological commitments. 
A Western ideological perspective is one way of viewing the 
process. Briefly put, rural Alaska Natives as Alaska citizens 
are denied due process of law. The uneven quality and presence 
or absence of representational and judicial services denies them 
opportunities to defend themselves or argue cases before the 
courts .10 The uneven quality or presence or absence of police 
services denies them protection of the state laws.11 
From a cultural perspective, Natives have been miseducated as 
to the Western legal process as it has been presented and 
experienced over time. They have also been encouraged to par­
ticipate in an extra-legal hybrid system which prepares them to 
make mistakes as each confronts representatives of Western legal 
authority. 
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The professional bureaucratic perspective emphasizes super­
vision and control from higher levels to lower levels. It is 
difficult if not impossible to establish a system of justice in 
smaller Native communities satisfactory to this objective. 
Perspective Village The 
The village perspective seems to be a desire for control suf­
ficient to deal with matters early and efficiently and to employ 
the professional justice system for support when necessary. 
The Canadian working group addresses its task through a pro­
cess of research leading to discovery of areas where conflicting 
Anglo-American values and Eskimo values in substantive law will 
result in bitterness and anger among client populations (IEAUS, 
1981). 
Yet since the letter of the law formed out of statute and 
case law is essentially reinterpreted through direct explana­
tions, acts, or inaction by professional operatives in rural 
Alaska, the message of the law as written is in fact only a por­
tion of the whole process of legal experience for rural resi­
dents. 
At times the law is less burdensome than its impact in 
bureaucratic implementation. Several examples will illustrate 
this. 
Perspective Process Due The 
Even when policymakers have been less than convinced that 
values inherent in Native culture or past experience with 
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"traditional" council have ill-prepared Natives to cope with the 
Anglo-American adversary process, there is some general accep­
tance by the system that language barriers may prevent Native 
defendants from playing their role in a criminal process ( Conn 
and Hippler, 1973). 
Do defendants, for example, make knowing and voluntary  
waivers of rights? Do they perceive the difference between 
feeling guilty and being legally guilty? 
As researchers we traced this problem by comparing rural 
court process against American Bar Association standards ( Conn, 
1974), and by describing how council experience of confession ill 
prepared Native participants to allow the state to undertake its 
burden of proof (Conn and Hippler, 1973). We learned and 
reported that even Native court personnel asked defendants 
whether police complaints were "true" in Yupik and Inuit (Conn, 
1974b). 
Court decisions and training sessions have addressed due pro­
cess. So has legal education. Yet due process in Western terms 
has been stillborn as Western law has been extended into rural 
Alaska. 
The Alaska Supreme Court took up an appeal by a public 
defender in Bethel and concurred Nith his argument that a Native 
defendant had not made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his 
right to an attorney when it was established that his knowledge 
of the English language disabled him at arraignment. The state 
argued ( to no avail) that he had appeared previously and was 
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known to the Eskimo speaking magistrate ((Gregory � State, 
1976). 
The court explicitly recognized the impact of traditional 
bush justice practice on the problem and called on the court 
administrator to "develop bilingual explanations of basic 
rights."lla A year-long project resulted with a skilled Yupik 
linguist working with three trainees and a Bethel judge. 
Interpreters were trained in Anglo-American law so that a legal 
vocabulary could be developed along with standard instructions 
for defendants and juries. 
The net result of this effort has been negligible. The 
trainees were trained and forgot ten. In Bethel, Native court 
personnel viewed the trainees with some jealousy. As personnel 
spoke Yupik, trainees were not needed there. It was said that 
they were trained in some but not all dialects of Yupik Eskimos. 
Since juries were drawn from English-speaking Eskimos, easily 
obtainable from the 15-mile radius of villages surrounding the 
town of Bethel, the instructions were not used. 
The court system did not bring the trainees into urban Alaska 
where jailed Natives who spoke some English were said to be used 
as interpreters. It did not publicize their existence, and 
hureaucratically, the interpreters were forgotten. 
Process Due of Guardians as Magistrates 
The court looks to magistrates and Native court personnel for 
interpretation of meaning and values underlying instructions in 
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Native languages. The author was called into magistrate sessions 
in the early 70's. He prepared instructions which deviated from 
the magistrate handbook, ones that sought to distinguish between 
legal guilt and "feeling guilty" (Conn, 1972). His assumption 
was that paraprofessionals understood the difference and were 
prepared to educate village defendants. They needed only a use-
ful means of explanation. 
When he completed his presentation, he was told by the then 
Eskimo district court judge, "You are teaching the Eskimos how to 
lie." On further consideration of the context of these instruc-
tions in small villages, the Eskimo judge was probably right. 
While meaningful client waivers were unlikely, the court was 
satisfied if attorneys were appointed for defendants at arraign­
ment. This occurred in towns but rarely occurred in village set­
tings where defendants waived both their right to a hearing 
before a lawyer-judge (in town) and pled guilty, leaving it to 
the Native magistrate to ameliorate the situation (as before the 
village council). 
The ideological logic of the Western system can be as lost to 
Native paraprofessional judges as it is to their clients. It may 
be, however, that the logic of experience, which suggests that 
one bows to ultimate white legal authority (unless a public 
defender is placed by one's side) and hopes for the best is 
correct. 
The Native magistrate's capacity to try cases, to advise 
clients and to reject overtures by police who might attempt to 
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influence the justice process has been a matter of ongoing 
bureaucratic concern by the state court system in the past 10 
years. Two advisory committees of lawyers headed by the chief 
justice mulled over the problems of that component (Second 
Magistrate Advisory Committee, 1979). Of primary concern was the 
challenge of authorizing persons with lay education to adjudicate 
cases in villages ill-equipped to sustain a judicial officer. 
That is, magistrates lacked proper "facilities" ( courtrooms and 
jails) and support from police regularly hired. Finally, no 
magistrate outside of towns could be justified in terms of his 
caseload. 
We researchers pointed out that magistrates displaced but did 
not actually replace village justice systems in Eskimo villages. 
We and Native organizations advocated and tested variant forms of 
dispute adjustment more reflective of small villages' needs and 
capacities ranging from mediation panels which might operate 
alongside a fining or adjudicative authority to councils or 
boards vested with the limited judicial authority which the 
magistrate possessed (See Case, 1977). 
Alternates System Court No 
What alternative could the court offer? As will be 
discussed, the court system toyed with the concept of alternative 
forms of dispute adjustment, following the first bush justice 
cortference, but then rejected it explicitly as a court function 
(Second Magistrates Advisory Committee, 1979: 19).llb 
Researchers pointed out that these lay judges were poorly 
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trained in Western law and operated in isolation of Western 
justice systems. The court responded by upgrading its internal 
training program. Yet what they could not create through 
training was the direct experience of adjudication or court busi­
ness. Public defenders, if drawn into a case, sought hearings 
before professional judges. Few consumers or professionals went 
to village magistrate court with requests that the cases be tried 
there (Timbers Interview, 1973). 
Urban magistrates were useful to Urban Alaska for traffic 
cases and bail hearings. Non-Native and lawyer magistrates were 
apparently familiar with approaches of traditional legal seminars 
and correspondence programs and usually were busy in their posi­
tions. Town magistrates, Native and non-Native, learned through 
their ongoing association with judges and lawyers. 
Village magistrates remained as figures who accepted guilty 
pleas, a constitutional embarrassment. Village lay judges were 
an embarrassment to be suffered in silence by a state court 
system which prided itself on the quality of its judicial pro-
duct. California had rejected lay judges in cases which could 
result in jail when lawyers were available (Gordon v. Justice Ct, 
1974). The U.S. Supreme Court had accepted them providing that 
( as in Alaska) defendants could choose hearings before lawyer­
judges (North v. Russell, 1976). 
The chief justice recognized that this choice was no signifi­
cant choice at all. To opt for professional justice meant that 
the party or parties would need to move to town or that the court 
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would need to move to the village. 
What alternative was available for cases where parties simply 
wishect fast, efficient disposition of their cases? 
The court's second magistrate advisory committee considered 
but then rejected ideas such as ( 1) village magistrates would 
accept guilty pleas only, (2) that representation would be 
afforded in each village case; or ( 3) that magistrates' cases 
would be subjected to special ongoing review (Second Magistrate 
Advisory Committee, 1978). 
While the magistrate supervisor and training judges made fre­
quent visits to village locations, and cassette recordings of 
cases were made and transmitted to Anchorage, neither solution 
allowed for the normal monitoring of court conduct by informed 
consumers or professional advocates. 
From an administrative point of view, the 28-odd Native 
magistrates represented a needless drain on resources. The 
administrators argued that magistrates did not generate caseloads 
sufficient to be in every village or even in those villages pre­
viously selected for magistrate posts. People did not bring many 
complaints to magistrates. 
More importantly, most villages lacked facilities and all 
lacked attorneys. Thus they pressed for these prerequisites to 
placement of further magistrates. These criteria, it was 
suggested, would automatically bar placement in most Native 
villages. The criteria were adopted by the committee as advisory 
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as advisory and not mandatory (Committee, 1979:2). Unofficially 
accepted by the court administration, their application since 
1977 has resulted in no new magistrate posts in 112 Native vil­
lages without courts and in removal of five former posts since 
the committee issued its recommendations in 1979.12 
To remove magistrates would leave what alternative? The 
court system has adamantly refused to recognize village council 
justice as an acceptable component of the process. It ignored a 
suggestion by researchers that councils act as lay assessors at 
the sentencing phase (Committee, 1978). 
What else could be suggested? The presiding judge of the 
Fairbanks court suggested that superior court judges, freed from 
urban court calendars, be assigned to regular village circuits. 
The circuit proposal was drawn from some limited understanding of 
the Canadian scheme of judicial service (See Morrow, 1974). Yet 
what committee members failed to understand, was that the "flying 
courts" of Canada dealt with a tiny percentage of cases left 
unhandled by justices of the peace in most settlements. Maps 
were drawn for the circuits and the idea found its way into the 
committee's final recommendations. There it disappeared with 
other recommendations, never to reappear on budgetary requests 
and never to be adopted by the State Supreme Court. ( But see 
Footnote 20A. ) 
The Canadian scheme did not speak to the issue which the 
court administrators so desired to define out of existence. On 
what terms would the state provide officially for the daily busi-
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ness of law in small villages? 
What the court has left in place by near-inaction is a 
limited allocation of magistrates in 28 of 140 villages, offi­
cially prepared to adjudicate cases, but in fact capable of and 
positioned only to turn arrests into guilty pleas. 
Due process was not being afforded on Western terms to small 
villages. Most villages were left to their own devices. 
Yet, magistrates could at least be said to be Natives, and 
trained to be judges. If they, in turn, mitigated guilty pleas 
by sentencing lightly, or bent to community pressure, perhaps 
they could be blamed or praised but the court system could not be 
criticized for lacking Native participation. Serious cases 
would, after all, be drawn into town courts. 
It is little wonder t.hut this system reinforces longer term 
experience with councils and state troopers. It communicates to 
individual villagers that, defendants' rights aside, the best 
course of action for villagers is to plead guilty and depend upon 
the good graces of legal authority.13 
education, legal community the than louder speaks Experience 
text­lectures, through proffered and court the by recommended 
McKenzie, and 1977 al, et Barthel e.g., (See movies and books 
976b). 1
Process Due and Notice 
The concept of notice so critical to mobilization or manipu­
lation of our legal process has been addressed by the courts. 
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       venue ofchangea bothallowtowereThese    developed.betohad
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       non-payment forrationaleanyvirtuallyonbasedthere
    1974). ,WardMontgomeryv.(Aguchak
In this case, the plaintiffs were residents of a village near 
Bethel who spoke Yupik. 
The resultant form developed by a court clerk was every bit 
as confusing as its predecessor. No Yupik language component was 
added. At best it was hoped that the form would be taken to an 
English speaking person in the village or in town and that events 
would propel defendants to a legal services attorney who 
would request a change of venue. 
Attorneys for creditors denounced the opinion as making less 
likely the extension of credit to rural consumers by urban 
merchants. In fact, the opinion has done little more than 
strengthen the bargaining position of defendants' attorney in 
rural towns if and when he is apprised of the action. 
process due of components and vehicles educational as - Juries 
Jury participation by rural residents in rural cases has been 
viewed by the court as educating rural residents to Western law, 
inducing participation necessary to protect rural defendants, and 
granting them direct participation in the legal process. 
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Yet, this constitutional right of judgment by a jury of one's 
rural peers, (Alvarado v. State, 197 1), has had the impact envi­
sioned only as it comports with other bureaucratic con­
siderations. Chief among these is the price of taking a trial to 
a rural location. The cost of the move and assessment of the 
availability of facilities suitable for housing and feeding the 
court and its entourage ( as determined by the district's court 
administrator and presiding judge of the superior court in the 
district) are held up as appropriate counterweights to a request 
for jury trial in a rural location. 
How then are rural juries impaneled? In town locations, 
where a district attorney resides, both grand and petit juries of 
rural persons are commonplace. But here again, the geographic 
scope of selection narrows the choice to persons living in 
the  town or in villages near to it (See Tugateek v. State, 1981). 
It is not surprising that traditional Yupik-speaking persons, 
for example, do not serve on juries. And, younger Native juries 
refuse to convict town bootleggers even in the face of outcries 
from villages impacted by illicit liquor supply. 
In urban Anchorage or Fairbanks, requests for rural jurors 
are met by drawing rural persons into the city to stay in the 
Holiday Inn. Urban Alaska grand juries continue to indict 
Aleutian Islanders who may live hundreds of miles away for felo­
nies. Court and advocacy professionals move little if at all 
into village Alaska. 14 
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Sensitivity" "Culture of Name the in Lies 
As an official matter, there has been far less enthusiasm for 
mounting a system of law based on cultural pluralism than in 
other colonial situations. 
It is not in the American tradition, we have been led to 
believe, to allow separate justice systems in a single state to 
coexist. 
Arthur Hippler, a former associate and now sel £-proclaimed 
Libertarian, recently wrote "Why in justice should anyone in an 
urban place be required to subsidize a lifestyle in the bush 
which avoids urban difficulties, but demands urban levels of 
service? 1115 
His statement may reflect typical white urban opinion, but it 
certainly does not reflect village desires. 
The record shows persistent attempts by villagers to 
construct their own system as a component of the state process. 
Rather than sustain this effort with an eye (for reasons cultural 
or economic) to adaptation to village needs, government officials 
charged that friends of Alaska Natives were attempting to make 
their own system two systems, one for city and town and one for 
villages. 
Ordinances Village 
Villages have requested assistance in the drafting of their 
own town statutes. They realize that some skilled professional 
advice is necessary in order to make the laws enforceable within 
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the state system and to allow them to meet local problems with 
remedies and reasonable sanctions. 
When ordinances have been sent to Juneau to an agency consti­
tutionally obligated to help towns and villages, they have been 
filed away without comment.16 Villages have been left in a legal 
never-never land as troopers and state officials refuse to apply 
village ordinances. Even village magistrates scorn village ordi-
nances. 
No single area of village lawmaking has suffered more from 
this inability to discover and frame ordinances capable of sup­
port and reinforcement than the realm of alcohol control. This 
can be of little surprise when one realizes that until 1953 
Alaska law prohibited the sale to or purchase of liquor by Alaska 
Natives. With its repeal and the coming of statehood, in 1959, 
village councils discovered that their own bans on possession of 
liquor in villages were not officially lawful (Conn, 1981b). In 
the early 1970' s public and private drunkenness statutes were 
decriminalized. While towns responded with vigorous law enforce­
ment under the guise of "protective custody," villages lacked 
this option. What had occurred was the removal of territorial 
and later state legal support for preventative actions which 
villages were capable of carrying out to anticipate and avoid 
liquor related violence. 
Villagers were told to turn back to "the old ways" and draw 
upon a village consensus on possession backed by village law. 
But the "old ways" were formed out of a coalition of white and 
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Native authority. The "old way" did not contend with prepaid 
orders by telephone, improved air and land transport and wage 
opportunities of a younger generation as demanding of their offi­
cial legal rights as other Alaskans. 
In response to this breakdown, villagers looked for support 
from each "legal expert" who flew in. Few visitors were prepared 
to discuss legal options available when prohibition was not. 
Most took the path of least resistance and gave verbal support to 
searches at the airport and other village remedies. It was, 
after all, "their village." 
In 1981 the Alaska legislature passed a bill which allowed 
villages to prohibit transport or possession of liquor into their 
villages (Alaska Legal Services Corp, 1981). Five villages imme­
diately made plans for elections. Yet the bill is unconsti tu­
tional on its face. Alaska has established that even personal 
use of marijuana in one's home is protected by a "right to 
privacy" (Ravin v. State, 1975). The alcohol law will stand 
until someone sues. And, of course, some person, Native or 
non-Native, residing in a Native viJ.lage, will sue. Social 
control is not ultimate control in modern village Alaska. 
So villages have been given what they want in lieu of devel­
oping schemes (through Federal Indian law or through zoning) 
capable of withstanding legal challenge. Would such a bill have 
been proffered to a white community? I doubt it. 
The bill reflects the constant message of a justice· system 
prepared only to withdraw authority of Natives and replace it 
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with a system of laws and personnel which cannot but fai 1 to 
reliably address village problems. 
Examples and Premises -Research Justice Bush 
Two early premises suggest the direction of social science 
and law research conducted in Alaska. This research generated 
proposals, reports and field experimentation in several realms. 
Two of these realms will be discussed: the development of para­
legal training and the development of the problem boards. 
We offered to "define for policymakers 11 "the substance of 
cultural variation and norm differentiation that has direct 
implication for (1) the operation of the legal system and (2) for 
the training of members of other cultures in Anglo-American law 
and procedure in old roles as well as new ones," and "new methods 
of dispute resolutions and new job categories in law that might 
be formally adopted in order to provide improved access and par­
ticipation in legal procedures by Alaskan Natives" (Conn, 1973). 
Put another way, we perceived ourselves as academic legal 
culture brokers, prepared to make comprehensible, practical 
adjustments to both the village and state sides of the justice 
system. 
Our primary target was not a law process as measured by 
either ideological Western considerations or perceived Native law 
ways, but what we viewed to be an amalgam of both systems with 
adjustments necessary on both sides. 
Our focus was on the bottom of the system. Our goal was to 
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to improve the daily operation of law as reflected in perceived 
village needs by developing methods for enhanced interaction be­
tween state and village processes as we had come to understand 
them. These methods were to be sustainable and acceptable to 
village consumers and justice policymakers and field operatives. 
Paralegals 
Paralegals in this context took on special importance. 
Unlike the new, urban private law legal assistants who have 
evolved into a discrete professional category by taking upon 
themselves a variety of lawyer's tasks, we viewed rural parale­
gals as capable of performing activities not then undertaken by 
either professionals or members of the village justice systems 
(Conn and Hippler, 1973; Conn, 1974). 
The first was to combine town and village justice. By moving 
out from the town to villages where crimes had occurred, the 
rural paralegal would investigate and report back to the pro­
fessional those social facts (as well as legal facts) overlooked 
by police. The police report had almost exclusive bearing on 
legal decisions, such as bail, screening, charges, case organiza-
tion and disposition. No longer would the professional have to 
depend on a police report or on conventional wisdom among field 
professionals to evaluate his case with an eye toward its impact 
on the real community affected. 
For the Native consumers and village law, the paralegal would 
explain town legal process and often provide a comprehensive 
analysis to villagers of the advantages and disadvantages of par-
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ticipation in it. 
We chose paralegals as legal culture brokers in the field 
for several reasons. There was little or no chance of Native 
Alaskans from villages rising to the positions of professional 
operative. Native lawyers were and are in short supply. l 7 A 
paralegal's appreciation of the underlying logic of both village 
and state systems through education and experience was more 
certain. 
Our attempts to educate legal professionals in the anthropo­
logical underpinnings of Native law ways had resulted at best in 
stereotyping inappropriate to the variety of relationships which 
actually existed, and, at worst in casual rejection of these mat-
ters (See Conn, 1972b). Their own case management dominated 
their considerations. 
Paralegals well trained in Anglo-American law and capable of 
understanding its connection with village process could be 
influential if not powerful in the professional decision-making 
process. It should be added that at least in the case of one 
critical bureaucracy, the Di vision of Corrections, two Native 
correctional aides carried out independently the work of that 
department in juvenile disposition, and probation and parole in 
rural Alaska.17a 
Thus, we were not playing upon desires of departments to 
increase the cultural sensitivity of their operatives in rural 
Alaska so much as we were providing a way for them to carry out 
their activity in a far superior, efficient manner from the 
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standpoint of their bureaucracy. We could argue the cost-
effectiveness of our reform on man hours spent in village travel 
to even the most bigoted and indifferent agency chief. 
A second paralegal role was developed for villages. As we 
put it in an early paper of this village resident: 
He would be aware, as non-Native professionals often are 
not, that the introduction of a dispute into a court 
system is a belated choice in a sequence of informal and 
formai" opportunities for dispute resolution. To the 
extent that this fundamental culture blindness by pro­
fessionals has bypassed informal opportunities for 
dispute resolution, the Native paralegal might help to 
encourage a renewal of such informal procedures. These 
procedures can become a valuable tool in Alaskan rural 
justice, not because they are romantically tied to a 
cultural heritage, but because they have worked in the 
past to alleviate disputes, and can be made to work in 
the future. Thus, we perceive a Native paralegal as a 
pragmatist who would not compromise his clients' 
interests for the sake of procedure, whether formal or 
informal. He would be able to relate his role, for 
example, to conciliation between disputants as well as 
to the prerequisites for adversarial representation. 
(Conn, 197 3 ) 
The paralegal we envisioned would work with villagers to 
assess con£ licts, to assess their appropriate sequence in the 
chain of legal process and, finally, to assess where and at what 
cost the most appropriate remedy lay within the process. He 
would also direct problems back into the village justice process 
when appropriate and draw in support for such a solution. 
Our belief in village paralegals stemmed from several con-
siderations. First, we had recognized and reported on the depen-
dence of the rural justice process upon paralegals in a variety 
of village roles (Conn and Hippler, 1973). Second, we were con-
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vinced that the state legal process would not be introduced in 
village Alaska with any balanced concern for the integrity of 
either the Western process or understanding of the village law 
process, its strengths and its weaknesses. We perceived that, at 
best, state justice agencies would make village connections with 
a magistrate and a policeman. The screening function so essen­
tial to the integrity of both systems, carried on previously by 
the council, or left to a village policeman would be ignored or 
left to chance (Conn, 1975). Professionalization would increase 
the tendency to intervene in village matters without concern for 
the propriety of that intervention on the single dispute or on 
the village law process. 
I set the village paralegal within a model system which con­
tained a problem board for conciliation, a magistrate for adjudi-
cation, a policman and a correctional aide. Thus each component 
of the system would have its own contact point. But more than 
this villages (or clusters of villages where appropriate) would 
have at their service a system with a complete range of alter-
natives linked in turn to town professionals. (Conn, 1974). 
My scheme was of course a dream scheme. It required some 
collaboration between agencies to be accomplished. Agencies were 
prepared to work on their own behalf, but quick to charge 
failures to other agencies which were inoperative. The agency 
with least interest in rural justice at any level was the 
Division of Corrections. As we shall see, this indifference and 
inaction made a village law system or even vigorous intervention 
of other justice agencies unworkable, unadaptable and dangerous. 
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Response Bureaucratic Their and Accomplished Projects 
In the years that followed we were able to test the proposi­
tion of the town based paralegal who worked for either a district 
attorney or public defender. A training-tutorial mechanism was 
established in both Nome and Bethel. 
Bush professionals, especially prosecutors, remarked that 
their professional collaboration with villages were enhanced. 
Trainees became serious members of the rural process. 
Yet in this instance as in many others where plans proposed 
or actually implemented at the town and village level received 
strong support from field professionals and village residents 
alike, reaction from urban bureaucracies was indifferent or 
hostile. 
LEAA representatives from Seattle questioned the use of 
$100,000 to underwrite the establishment of regional training 
programs whose end result was apparently four new professionals. 
Their concern was sufficient to induce the state Criminal Justice 
Planning Agency in Juneau to ignore the project. CJPA allowed 
it to lapse without evaluation. 
The state attorney general had promised in writing to budget 
permanent positions for successful trainees. He at tempted to 
renege on his promise. Only the threat of newspaper exposure by 
the Bethel trainee saved his job. He was and is the only Native 
member of the rural Department of Law. 
A paralegal trainee with the Public Defender Agency also 
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received high marks. Yet when the agency was in need of a second 
town attorney, she was encouraged to resign. She became a 
magistrate. 
More problems loomed on the horizon. The Alaska Division of 
Personnel unilaterally defined paralegal positions and estab­
lished testing procedures. No provision was made for job 
requirements (including language competence). The district 
attorney's paralegal failed the test on several occasions. 
Paralegals Village 
The Alaska Legal Services Corporation established paralegal 
positions in Native villages on Alaska's North Slope. These 
trainees were educated to discover and investigate Western law 
problems and to channel cases into the state process and back 
into the village realm. One case discovered and investigated by 
a village paralegal should shortly put to the test the impact of 
correctional activity in village Alaska ( see Neakok v. Di vision 
of Corrections, 1981, described below). 
Yet, when Alaska Federation of Natives funding from its CETA 
program disappeared, the village paralegals lost their positions, 
becoming others in a long line of Native men and women "trained 
into oblivion." 
Experiment Board Problem The 
The problem board experiment was grounded in careful study of 
the village council process both historical and contemporary 
throughout the 75 villages which comprise Eskimo Alaska. 
Assessment of village councils through study of their records and 
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on the scene investigations led to our proposal to the court to 
test the proposition that a non-adversarial mediation panel could 
be established in villages. It would deal with matters then 
deemed inappropriate for either modern councils engaged in fining 
and jailing extralegally or magistrates (Conn and Hippler, 1974). 
In association with the Eskimo village of Emmonak we worked on 
the process. It was in fact a process of rediscovery since 
Emmonak had only recently delegated its dispute adjustment to 
village police and a magistrate. The state had provided these 
Western law figures with a portable "holding facility" (jail). 
The council had been able to drop its role as fining and 
jailing council. They had done this with some relief. 
Yet villagers recognized that an element of the earlier pro­
cess was missing. The magistrate spoke of the family counseling 
she was called upon to undertake. She desired something like the 
old council to take up this activity. Problems with juveniles 
and other problems not clearly legal were mentioned. These were 
reflective of disputes heard by the village council. 
With the village we devised what we called conciliation 
boards ( drawing upon literature on village complaint boards in 
Ceylon) . Villagers changed the name to problem boards. 
Villagers selected persons capable of problem solving, young and 
old, all Yupik speaking. They rejected the village priest when 
he volunteered. 
The researchers determined that voluntary conciliation under 
Alaska law could be used as an alternative to prosecution for 
misdemeanors in most cases. They emphasized that the board would 
not and could not fine or jail persons. This would be left up to 
the magistrate (Conn and Hippler, 1974). 
The village developed the concept on its own. We had antici­
pated that matters would flow naturally from police to the 
magistrate and then be diverted by her to the problem board. In 
fact, what occurred was that matters moved independently to the 
board directly (Conn and Hippler, 1975). 
The problem board during its test phase dealt with matters 
which did not have clear legal remedies. These often involved 
situations involving alcohol which, if left uncounseled, were 
expected to result in violence. 
For example, the board counseled A who gave liquor to B, 
causing family chaos. It counseled C who teased D for using 
welfare money to play bingo. When E, a teacher aide, kicked F, a 
student, it drew E and G (his parent) together to work out a 
compromise. It dealt with difficult family problems involving 
drinking, wife beating and child abuse. Juvenile matters were 
often considered. 
In the main, it anticipated violence. It had no power to 
fine or jail but could refer (and be referred) cases to and from 
the magistrate and the police. 
When the model became an experimental "prograttl" within the 
court system, the court personnel in charge selected villages 
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with little concern for forming relationships with entities 
capable of employing punitive sanctions. Only at the specific 
request of the researchers was the test village included. 
In one region, the Eskimo district court judge situated in 
the nearest town was overtly interested in the project. In a 
second region a college-trained presiding Eskimo magistrate was 
overtly hostile, concerned only about his own station. 
While the problem board provided a mechanism for Native 
language speakers of all educational backgrounds to participate, 
only some villages were given to understand that one's skills at 
negotiation and conciliation and not youth and education were 
primary criteria. 
Court personnel did not feel comfortable with village 
experience at dispute adjustment. They held a workshop for 
problem board members at an urban resort and had members of the 
American Arbitration Association employ models of conciliation 
drawn from labor, prison and other urban settings to teach the 
Eskimos how to do their job. 
Board members were paid ten dollars per sitting, devaluing 
their job in the eyes of other members of the village legal 
system. 
Test villages grafted the board into their processes with 
varying degrees of success. In village X near Bethel the board 
found a niche between the police and now-fining and jailing coun-
cil. However, cases were screened by the village policeman for 
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appropriate disposition (Conn, 1975).17b 
After two years the court hired an attorney ano anthropolo-
gist to evaluate the boards. Although the report was favorable 
to those boards which had been active, it stress en the l imi teo 
number of matters heard (Marguez and Serdahely, 1977). 
The court's response was to end its association with the 
experiment based on the limited number of cases taken to problem 
boards. From its perspective, the boards had failed because they 
had not replaced either magistrates or extra-legal councils which 
fined or jailed when magistrates or outside assistance was not 
available. They were never intended to do this. 
Although the court disassociated itself from the project, a 
55 village survey two years later discovered three of the six 
problem boards established were still in operation (Angell, 
1979). 
What do these experiments suggest about rural justice? It 
would appear that no experiment, however well attuned to village 
need or cultural values, however well-received by villagers and 
however useful to the entire legal process and limited resources 
will succeed without a political commitment as yet unattained in 
Alaska. 
The court system refused until 1975 to establish a superior 
court in the town of Bethel. Only when the Judicial Council 
advocated establishment of independent judicial districts in 
rural Alaska, did the court establish service areas for Bethel 
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and Barrow. It had argued that few cases merited fulltime pro-
fessional service in Bethel. Today there are two fulltime 
district attorneys and two public defenders. No one argues that 
there is no business for the Bethel court and the 5 7 villages 
within its domain. 
Subsistence 
Mobilization of legal resources to fight for a change in the 
legal structure have occurred in one instance. Alaska Natives 
generated tremendous lobbying force when the enforcement arm of 
the Department of Fish and Game began to threaten traditional 
hunting and fishing activities. 
With the assistance of urban action groups, rural Alaskans 
fought for and achieved a separate state department for sub­
sistence and an amendment in state law which gave preferential 
rights to subsistence activities (Feldman, in press). An attempt 
to establish regional fish and game boards though introduced by 
the Governor failed. The backlash from urban sportsmen has been 
tremendous. Nonetheless as an exercise in reform of rural 
justice, the press for change in the pattern and content of law 
in this realm is instructive. 
As one expert put it, Alaska Natives now have their own seat 
at the table, a piece of the state bureaucracy prepared to press 
for their own preferences in development of fish and game policy. 
(Smith, 1981) 
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Borough Slope North The 
The state constitution provides that the unorganized borough 
may be subdivided into organized boroughs (Alaska State 
Constitution, Art. 10, Sec. 3, 1959). The 7,000 person North 
Slope Eskimo population in the mid-1970's laid claim on oil reve­
nues through a property tax by enclosing nine villages into a 
borough. It also used revenues from oil to establish governmen-
tal services. 
The villagers gave over their police powers to the borough as 
it established a North Slope Borough Police Department. 
It had been envisioned by planners that these police would be 
"different" from either troopers or village constables. Each 
would be trained to be all-purpose employees capable of fire 
fighting, first aid and other tasks along with policework. This 
same proposal to turn police into village public service officers 
has been renewed in 1981 by the Department of Public Safety as it 
begins to train,and fund village police. 
On the North Slope, the proposal to reform the police was 
never accomplished. Legions of white police from "the Lower 48" 
were recruited and continue to be recruited by the Department. 
Few Natives volunteer for service (Angell, 1977). 
While it was envisioned that locally funded professional 
police would induce the state to collaborate with additional pro­
fession�l services, at least in the town of Barrow, such has not 
been the case. 
The Department of Public Safety withdrew its single trooper 
during the "transitional period." The Division of Corrections 
withrlrew its correctional aide. '1'he court remodeled the court 
but left a single magistrate in place for nine villages. The 
Department of Law and state Public Defender Office continued to 
make periodic trips to Barrow as did the superior court. As 
cases were dismissed for lack of prosecution, police came to pick 
up persons on lesser offenses and non-offenses such as protective 
custody. Juveniles detained were removed to Fairbanks and 
Anchorage as had always been the case. 
A six-fold increase in arrests reflected the change from 
underpolicing to what could be termed overpolicing (Boedeker, 
1981). Permanent officers were stationed in each village (save 
one) and complements of 20 or more officers were stationed in the 
2,000 person town of Barrow. Village councils did not partici­
pate in what was now borough police business. American justice 
(or at least police) had arrived in one part of village Alaska. 
Corrections on Footnote A 
As researchers of village law, no area of problems and oppor­
tunity was delineated with greater clarity than that of correc­
tional activity. Village legal process is, in Western terms, 
very much oriented to correctional alternatives. Its mainstay 
has been historically to move fr0m problems to focus on repair of 
relationships among village people, young and old (Conn and 
Hippler, 1973; Conn, 1976). 
Yet it is in this same area where the state has shown its 
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greatest indifference. As in the previous decade, corrections 
officers deal with problems of juveniles and adults at more than 
Qrms' length, preferring to to transmit the prohlems to towns an� 
cities for disposition then return them to the village. Few 
attempts are made at forming lines of communication or support 
with villages. 
At times the end result has been tragic. In a case now 
pending in superior court (Neakok, et al v. Division of Correc­
tions, et al, 1981), the Division of Corrections is being sued 
for negligence. 
Jacob B was convicted for the violent assault and rape of a 
resident of a ninety-person Arctic village. Alcohol was involved 
and treatment was recommended. 
His sentencing report disclosed several other violent and 
unreported rapes while drinking. This information was made 
public as his attorney challenged its use in an appeal to the 
supreme court. While incarcerated, Jacob B wrote to his trial 
judge pleading for treatment as an alcoholic prior to his 
release. A state supreme court case had mandated treatment by 
the Division of Corrections for persons convicted of crime asso-
ciated with serious alcohol abuse. Jaco B was paroled without 
treatment to his home village. 
His corrections officer had never visited the village. He 
did not know that the village had no police officer or alcohol 
treatment program. As there was no other person that the corrc-
tions officer could trust to report on Jacob's conduct, he had 
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the parolee fill out and mail in forms every month to ascertain 
that all was well and that Jacob was still in the village. 
After six months Jacob began drinking. He killed a child, a 
woman and a man. He was returned to Fairbanks for a new trial. 
Will the suit induce reform of the correctional system and 
some collaboration with village Alaska or will it induce the 
Parole Board to hold Native offenders in jail or in large cities? 
The latter, given the record of ten years, seems more likely. 
When the second magistrate advisory committee noted the 
impact on judicial activity of correctional inaction and 
suggested that magistrates might serve as probation aides, the 
idea was scrapped as a confusion of roles. 
Why is the correctional process so important? There is a 
second reason more dangerous as a practical matter than the first 
reason - that customary law process has much to offer Western 
correctional practice . 1 7c That is a loss, but small in com­
parision to a more direct danger to Native people. 
For as it stands, the only direction the state legal process 
will go is to a position of increased professionalization in the 
villages and more official arrests in that place. The end result 
of this will be more Alaska Natives in urban and (for longterm 
offenders) out-of-state jails. 1 8 
This phenomenon is already apparent in the state's juvenile 
process. When urban youth are "taken into custody" they are 
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usually dealt with through a process of what is termed informal 
disposition by an intake officer. As a practical matter, the 
intake officer calls in the mother and father or the teacher or 
the priest for a chat. Then he can place the youth on informal 
probation. 
Bush young arrested by troopers disappear into the system. 
They are taken into a town and city of some distance from the 
village. The mother and father cannot be called in so easily 
(Lou Reese Interview, 1973). The tendency is to institutionalize 
the child. That means in English that juvenile facilities are 
filled with rural Natives. Needless to say these institutions 
are not staffed by Native people. Native youth are disappearing 
into state institutions at a rate far in excess of their numbers 
proportionate to the population.19 
Present The 
A 1977 study of 55 villages indicates that the carnage of 
village Alaska is now truly impressive with murder, rape and 
violent crime rates two and three times the state average and 
many times those of the nation (Angell, 1981).20 
Village councils persevere in 25 percent of the sample sur­
veyed, skewed in fact to favor villages with magistrate service 
(Angell, 1981). The dependence of villages upon outside police 
service or service of constables who act as liaisons to state 
troopers suggest that village control has been weakened and not 
strengthened. 
The court system has disavowed rural trials where facilities 
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are inadequate to house personnel (Supreme Court rule 18-1). It 
has disavowed experiments with alternative forms of dispute reso-
lution. It has not acted upon plans proposed to it to attempt 
circuit riding. It trained and then forgot its court interpre­
ters (See Annual Report, Alaska State Court System, 1981 ).20a 
When its developed in-house research organ inadvertently 
discovered that Natives in urban courts receive longer prison 
terms for nonviolent offenses ( Alaska Judicial Council, 1 979), 
its judges attacked the problem by bringing up to the level of 
Natives, non-Native' s sentences and not by encouraging correc­
tional alternatives (Alaska Judicial Council, 1 980). 
Magistrates placed in earlier days exist as curious anachro­
nisms in rural villages, hearing fewer cases than councils did in 
their extra-legal state or even the problem boards rejected by 
the court (Alaska State Court System, 1981 ). 
Paralegals trained to work with bush district attorneys and 
public defenders have been forced to resign by their bureaucra-
cies even in the face of support by field personnel. The state 
personnel department has developed a test for such state posi­
tions which ignores language and job competence and emphasizes 
skills in math competence. 
to funds received now has Safety Public of Department The , 
systems, detention with along villages in police village place 
21 stem.syWestern partial a creating 
correctional new no provided has Corrections of Division The 
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personnel to rural Alaska in ten years. Its Native correctional 
aides have retired. Its dubious contribution has been to make 
old town jails (in Bethel and Nome) over into modern town jails. 
We as researchers, fascinated both with cultural pluralism 
and committed to research leading to reform, must search our 
souls and consider whether or not the fruit of our labor will 
result in a legal process acceptable to any standard of justice 
or to none at all. Those of us who are lawyers first and anthro­
pologists second must consider whether we should steer away from 
research and lend our skills to law reform and political pressure 
and not to adaptation of the legal process and roles to fit small 
village situations. 
Small village justice has always been a target of manipula­
tion by outside forces. How else but through political combat in 
purely Western terms can indigenous people seek and obtain even 
partial control of their destiny? 
Since police are more mobile than other components of the 
system, and more receptive to bush service, this means construc­
tion of law systems that would make of villages "closed 
institutions" with guards and cells (Goffman, 1961). 
Were researchers deceived or did they allow themselves to be 
deceived? Were they blind to overriding political considerations 
that made of "cultural relevance" a convenient excuse for 
bureaucracies to employ unless or until they were prepared to 
establish a partial Western system in village Alaska, a system 
unacceptable by either state or village standards? 
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This assessment of ten years flows from a concern on my part 
that we who are infatuated with the opportunities for redefining 
a state law process to benefit an environment marked by cultural 
pluralism may find our work manipulated by those who underwrite 
it and apparently embrace it. From our global perspective should 
we not be impressed by the political imperatives that govern the 
entire process of bush justice? Chief among these is a battle 
for control of resources and populations which relinquishes none 
of that control to indigenous minorities on any terms without a 
fight. 
In Alaska, for example, it must be asked whether state 
authorities want village Alaska to survive. Is it not likely 
that state authorities would prefer an in-migration of Natives 
into the cities, that each rest easily on land claims dividends 
in Anchorage condominiums or sell their shares in village and 
regional Native corporations? 
Destabilization of village life may in the end be desired. 
Certainly the political firefight over natural resources and sub­
sistence hunting and fishing suggests that there is a large 
constituency whose definition of equal justice implies equal 
justice for persons like us, living like us, lost among us. 
Even if one does not pursue this perhaps conspiratorial line 
of inquiry, one must accept as a reality that despite the histor­
ical adaptation of Western law process to changing social and 
economic needs, that present policy makers and field operatives 
have been trained to believe that the systems in which they func-
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tion are a kind of evolutional by-product, natural and 
appropriate to all places and persons within the American politi­
cal domain. 
Though we may have scholars and historians who decry the phe­
nomenon, is it not the underlying message of legal development 
that the consumers and their problems must fit the process and 
not the converse (See Friedman, 1973)? 
My experience in Alaska suggests that the force of legal 
assimilation is the dominant force and that adaptations in the 
name of cultural imperatives are mere pauses (or worse than this, 
excuses) which conceal a longer term trend. 
As researchers, we in Alaska have tinkered with the system. 
We have listened and attempted to innovate within the system. 
What we have not accomplished is drawing Natives into the process 
as players, capable of negotiating change, possssing power and 
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In the 566,000 square �ile state of Alaska, half 0:::\ 
population live in towns and villages usually accessible only by 
river, sea or air. Within the latter rural population are 55,000 
Indians, Eskimos and Aleuts who reside in about 140 villages with 
populations from 25 to 700 persons and 300 persons on average. 
Another half dozen Native towns have populations from 1,500 to 
3,000 persons. "Bush j� ice �) is/ e r� foy•{egj\l pro­
cess which affects the/e 
iyq 
u�ant vi11Ves cl,od \As. 
2 Annotated descriptions of twenty articles, books, and 
papers written by Conn on rural justice appear in Donna L. Kydd, 
Ed., Towards A Legal Education and Information Program for 
Natives, Native Law Center, University of Saskatchewan, 
Saskatoon, Canada, 1979. 
3 Offices of the state public defender and state district 
attorney were established in Bethel after it received a permanent 
. •A--tr\ (�� 0 superior court judgeship. -00.vt 
?�.�� �) 
4 "During •  .  .  (1972) the Village Policemen handled ten� 
felony cases, 418 misdemeanors, and numerous noncriminal rJ.)--{... 
complaints. Seven of the felonies resulted in court action and 
128 of the misdemeanors resulted in court action. One hundred 
and fifty-one of the misdemeanors were handled by the Village 
Policemen without court or Council action." (Village Police 
Training Annual Report, 1972, p. 1.) 
-7i\V 
As the project director described it in presenting other sta­
tistics for the year which showed court action on 63 cases and 
council action on 171, "[They] also illustrate a unique rela­
tionship of two branches of government within the Criminal 
Justice system." (W. Nix, Subgrantee Professional Report, April 
11, 1972, p. 2.) The report noted, "the council has levied 
$1,835.00 in fines, and 38 days of jail time. In almost every 
case, days of work for the village satisfied council sentences
� 
\ L-- � � Criminal Justice Planning Agency personnel discouraged 
1 
I 




unds1 The Dep�rtment of Public 
Safety-- nad viewed education of co<'inci as necessary for 
/ 
village police activity to go fo:r?lard. //John Angell interview, 
1981. 
6 See, e.g. Recommendations, Second Bush Justice 
Conference, Minto, 1974 and Recommendations, Third Bush Justice 
Conference, Kenai, 1976; Alaska Judicial Council, Standards and 
Goals on Rural Justice, 1975. 
7 Criminal Justice Planner Butch Schwartz reported that 
only 10.8 percent of Alaska's LEAA block grants and 11.l of all 
LEAA funds directly benefited bush areas. Eighty per�ent of this 
amount went to construct five jails and to police programs. 
Schwartz, 1973:4. Angell (1981) reports that while small white 
communities are isolated for purposes of data collection in 
-72-
police statistics, village Alaska is included in a catchall cate-
gory. Nearly all white communities have a judicial officer. 
8 When, for example, it was discovered by Alaska Feder a-
tion of Natives that the Dillingham magistrate was a racist 
missionary who demanded that Natives swear off drink, who per­
suaded them not to request an attorney and who refused to visit 
surrounding villages, the court could do nothing. His refusal to 
send in documentation of his cases also prompted no disciplinary 
action. 
Ironically when magistrate A retired and was replaced by 
B, a legal services attorney, B was fired by the presiding judge 
for living with a mate in an unmarried state. The supreme court 
upheld the presiding judge. 
9 Of course differing discoveries by researchers or jour-
nalists or complaints lodged in higher courts had differing 
impacts on state bureaucracies. 
For example, the Department of Public Safety actively sup­
ported research which discovered that violent crimes had overrun 
limited village and state resources. Its desire was to shift 
resources from urban areas (where they competed with urban 
police) to rural sectors. Village police were taken under the 
wing of the Department of Public Safety (and even funded in 1981 
by them) as useful aides capable of dealing with minor drunken 
behavior without usurping primary police activities when major 
-73-
crime occurred. 
10 There are at least 112 small predominantly Native 
Alaskan cities (termed "Native villages") without resident state 
judicial officers. 
11 John Angell ( 1981) reports that only half of about 55 
villages surveyed had even a part time policem:� l \l\\°<6) 
The State Supreme Court in Gregory stated, "We also 
recognize that the trial court is obligated to be certain that 
each citizen, when involved in a criminal matter, is aware of the 
various rights guaranteed him by the Alaska and United States 
Constitution." To this was footnoted the following: 
"The Anglo-American system of justice differs 
substantially from the traditional Indiat;,l Eskimo and 
\ Aleut systems, which pre-dated Western cultures by 
I hundreds of years. The cultural difficulties experi­
r-1 1  enced by many of the Alaska Natives as the contemporary 
Anglo-American institutions reach out to the bush com­'3/4\ munities require that the State legal system use extreme 
(o/ I care in cases of this nature. Therefore, in those are?s 
where a substantial portion of the populations consits 
of Native Alaskans, we urge the administrative office of 
the court system to develop bilingual explanations of 
basic rights for those who appear in criminal pro­
ceedings so that all citizens are clearly aware of their 
constitutional rights." Gregory at p. 380. 
llb "Policy Regarding Alternative Processes for Local 
Resolution of Minor Disputes.� court should encourage villa­
ges and appropriate agencies to experiment with alternative pro­
cesses for out of court resolution of minor disputes, the court 
should not become actively involved in selecting, implementing, 
-74-
or evaluating alternative processes." Second Magistrate Advisory 
Committee, 1979:29. 
12 In the meantime the high state court took the recommen-
dations under consideration; they remain under consideration. 
13 How deeply ingrained is this rural attitude toward law 
can be gleaned from another unsuccessful appellate court case. 
Alaska Legal Services attorneys won a decision which required a 
state commission to hire Native persons in an outreach program to 
find and register Eskimo fishermen who were eligible for limited 
entry permits, extremely valuable "taxi medallions" which would 
henceforth limit the number of commercial fishing permits in 
Bristol Bay. Most Native applicants would have qualified based 
on past use. But many did not register. They avoided or ignored 
the Native registrants and official requests to apply. 
In a rehearing of the case (Wassillie v. Adasiak,1978), the 
author argued that legal literacy of Alaska Natives based on 
ongoing experience with trooper justice and judges who jailed had 
not prepared rural persons to assert legal rights, but merely to 
bow to authority or avoid it. The argument failed and Eskimo 
fishermen and their progeny, out of fear of the law, were banned 
forever from fishing waters commercially in their home region. 
14 Angell ( 1981) estimates that in villages he surveyed, 
legal professionals, other than troopers, appeared once a year or 
less. His conclusions seem to be reflected in an evaluation by 
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chart Angell's See agents. government state of officials village 
1. Appendix as reproduced 
15 11. -A1981, 26, July Times, Anchorage 
16 -pasprotest over passed Law of Department the 1973, In 
by used be to city class second a of formation on book a of sages 
jail or fine could councils that stated book The villages. many 
agrees offender the if ordinances local of violation for persons 
2-3, pp. City?, Class Second � What's See punishment. the to 
coopera­in Alaska of University Service, Extension perative Coo
State Affairs, Regional and Community of Department the with tion 
1972. Alaska, of 
17  1,300(among attorneys Native Alaska seven the Further, 
matters law urban with occupied are members) bar state licensed 
Havelock, and Sanborn bush. the in law to attracted yet not and 
1. : 1980
17a Trooper constables, not to be confused with village 
constables, are positions for Natives and others which remain 
bush positions and do not require shifts into urban Alaska or 
carry with them some initial hiring requirements. However, the 
work responsibilities appear to be equal to troopers. The 
program, a kind of police paraprofessional program, appears to 




178 experimentthe for personnel court by picked village One  
grievance as role its end should council its that convinced was 
young of board problem a of appointment the with processor 
at matters no heard board its period test the During adults. 
investigators Natives of Federation Alaska told village The all. 
(McKenzie, jailing. and fining of capable board a needed it that 
1976b). 
17C discov­similar a made has (1981) Finkler that seems It 
north. Canadian the in ery 
18 the of percent 32.2 comprised males adult Native Alaska 
State Sauser, Frank Source: 1980. in population jail state 
16) age (average population Native The Corrections. of Division 
. populationthe of percent 16 comprised 
19 2. Appendix See 
20 3. Appendix See 
20A womanAthabascan urban an credit, system's court the To  
as Council Judicial the on position non-lawyer a to appointed was 
district a appointed also court The drafted. being was paper this 
to Bethel from travel to area service Bethel the in judge court 
the for attorneys (with occurred had crimes where villages 
appointee first The cases. some hear to prosecution) and defense 
a duty. on while accident snow-go in legs both broke 
his sustain examples these opinion Justice's Chief the In 
view that many recommendations of the Second Magistrate Advisory 
Committee were acted upon and implemented by the Court system. 
Letter from Chief Justice Jay A. Rabinowitz to Stephen Conn, 
August 21, 1981, on file with the author. 
21 What could be termed an inadvertent reform of potential 
importance has been the recent state funding of women's shelters 
in towns with appropriations sufficient to allow women and 
children to fly from villages to towns. 
While Feminist expectations for these women unrealistically 
suggest that women and children should break loose from their 
home villages and familial connections and join the town or city 
labor market, these shelters do allow for short-term separation 
of family members in situations in which neither village justice 
nor state justice provides remedies. 
Women refuse to prosecute men when they are arrested. One 
problem with the program is that, like the new village police 
program, it now sits within the Department of Public Safety. If 
women are persuaded that they must file criminal complaints to 
use the shelters, the value of shelters as havens from violence 






Note, 23 Jan 2019: These appendices duplicate the content of the tables included in the original 
Appendix 1, Appendix 2, and Appendix 3, but have been formatted to make them accessible for 
users of screen readers. 
# % # % # % # % # % # %
Village Police 7 13.7 6 11.8 20 39.2 5 9.8 13 25.5 — —
AST 13 25.5 12 23.5 14 27.5 10 19.6 1 2.0 1 2.0
AF&W 7 13.7 6 11.8 17 33.3 13 25.5 4 7.8 4 7.8
Magistrates 14 27.5 7 13.7 8 15.7 3 5.9 14 27.5 5 9.8
Legal  Services 8 15.7 10 19.6 7 13.7 7 13.7 14 27.5 5 9.8
Prosecutor 3 5.9 11 21.6 9 17.6 5 9.8 11 21.6 12 23.5
Defense  Services 4 7.8 9 17.6 3 5.9 4 7.8 20 39.2 11 21.6
Probation/Parole 8 15.7 8 15.7 7 13.7 8 15.7 12 23.5 8 15.8
Local  Jail 2 3.9 3 5.9 11 21.6 9 17.9 22 43.1 4 7.8
Mental  Health 4 7.8 3 5.9 6 11.8 4 7.8 29 56.9 5 9.8
Medical  Services 15 29.4 11 21.6 17 33.3 4 7.8 2 3.9 2 3.9
State Jail 6 11.8 13 25.5 2 3.9 2 3.9 16 31.4 12 23.5
Educational Services 22 43.1 9 17.6 18 35.3 2 3.9 0 0.0 0 0.0
Fire 0 0 3 5.9 19 37.3 9 17.6 19 37.3 1 2.0
Welfare, Unempl. 10 19.6 16 31.4 13 25.5 6 11.8 2 3.9 4 7.8
Youth  Services 0 0 1 2.0 7 13.7 13 25.5 28 54.9 2 4.0
Appendix 1.
Source: Angell, John E. (1981)  Public Safety in the Justice System in Alaskan Native Villages, page 39.






Burglary 368 12 98 67 545
Larceny 1,361 85 304 43 1,793
Drug Abuse 419 15 57 19 510
Liquor Laws 403 3 308 183 897
All Other Offenses 230 7 67 15 319
Curfew & Loitering 173 2 32 19 226




Burglary 245.7 212.6 951.8 275.7 268.9
Larceny 908.9 1,506.5 2,952.6 176.9 943.8
Drug Abuse 279.8 265.8 553.6 78.2 268.4
Liquor Laws 269.1 53.1 2,991.4 753.2 472.2
All Other Offenses 153.6 12.4 650.7 61.7 167.9
Curfew & Loitering 115.5 35.4 310.8 78.2 118.9
All Crimes 2,670.1 1,640.9 12,626.3 2,057.8 3,130.5
Base Population 149,735 5,642 10,297 24,297 189,970
Source: Bayley, Bruce, et al (1980)   A Statistical Analysis of Discrimination in the Alaska Criminal 
Justice System.  Vancouver, Washington: Cascade Research Center.
1978 STATEWIDE COUNT
1978 STATEWIDE ARREST RATE PER 100,000 INDIVIDUALS










Homicide 28.4 10.9 8.8
Rape 99.2 50.3 26.4
Robbery 127.6 96.5 195.8
Aggravated Assault 326.0 286.5 228.6
Burglary 936.8 1,310.2 1,439.4
Vehicle Theft 446.5 3,272.6 2,921.3
Simple Assault 354.3 783.7 446.1
* Per 100,000 population in 1977.
Source: Angell, John E. (1981)  Public Safety in the Justice System in Alaskan 
Native Villages, page 27.
RATES*
COMPARISON OF ALASKA VILLAGES, ALASKA STATEWIDE, AND 
UNITED STATES CRIME RATES
Appendix 3.
